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 FCC Authority 
to Enforce Disclosure Requirements Critical to 
“Preserving the Open Internet” 
By Amanda Leese* 
I. WHAT’S THE TROUBLE WITH “PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET”2? 
¶1  Net neutrality is the network design principle that posits that a network realizes its 
maximum utility when content, data, and users are treated equally.
3
  Debate around an 
appropriate framework for network neutrality regulation has evolved significantly over 
the past two decades,
4
 along with the contours of the policy itself.
5
  As commercial and 
social activity moves increasingly online,
6
 clarity regarding net neutrality regulation 
grows ever more critical.  Yet despite a wealth of attention from proponents and 
 
*
 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law. 
1
 Comcast Corp.-NBC Universal v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 600 F.3d 642, 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
2
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,191, 59,191 (Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Preserving the 
Open Internet] (codified, in part, at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).   
3
 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQ, TIMWU.ORG, http://timwu.org/network_neutrality.html 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (“Network neutrality is best defined as a network design principle. The idea is 
that a maximally useful public information network aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms 
equally.”). 
4
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 51 
(June 2007) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT] (stating that regulatory debate regarding data transmission 
emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, and that public policy discussions and FCC rulemaking activity 
regarding broadband connectivity policy accelerated in the 2000s) (citing Vinton G. Cerf & David Farber, 
The Great Debate: What is Net Neutrality?, Hosted by the Center for American Progress, FORATV (July 
17, 2006), http://archive.org/details/net_neutrality_debate); Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the 
Internet Neutral?: Timothy Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007); see also 
James B. Speta, Supervising Managed Services, 60 DUKE L.J. 1715, 1721–32 (2011). 
5
 See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional 
Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 24–26 (2009) 
(explaining that net neutrality “means different things to different people”). 
6
 Various reports from government, private sector, and independent research institutions testify to this 
growth in online activity.  For example, in its second quarter (Q2) 2012 report, the U.S. Census Bureau 
showed a steady increase in the percentage of total retail sales composed of e-commerce retail activity over 
the past ten years, and reported that e-commerce sales as a percentage of total sales was 5.1%, up from 
4.9% in (Q1) 2012, and 4.6% in (Q2) 2011.  Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales, 2nd Quarter 2012, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.census.gov/ retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf.  And, 
business research firms report double digit growth rates for e-commerce sales in 2011 and project 
increasing margins of total retail sales from e-commerce. See Sucharita Mulpuru, U.S. Online Retail 
Forecast, 2011 to 2016, FORRESTER 1 (Feb. 27, 2012) (projecting that “online sales will grow from 7% of 
overall retail sales to close to 9% by 2016”).  The Pew Internet & American Life Project reports frequently 
on trends in online social activity, and in June 2012, reported that 82% of all American adults say they use 
the Internet at least occasionally, and for the first time, over half of adults aged 65 and older are online.  
Kathryn Zickuhr & Mary Madden, Older Adults and Internet Use, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE 
PROJECT 2 (June 6, 2012), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2281/;  see also Preserving the Open Internet, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 59,194 (discussing increased use of the internet as a source of news and forum for political 
discourse). 
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opponents alike, clarity remains elusive regarding federal authority for such regulation 
and the ideal scope of that regulation.  
¶2  A central inquiry in the debate regarding the net neutrality regulatory environment 
is the extent to which the federal government has the authority to regulate the network 
management practices of Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).7  Arguments for and 
against such regulation are well-trodden.
8
  Opponents have argued that market forces will 
result in the provision of quality services and caution that overly burdensome regulations 
will deter ISP innovation.
9
  Proponents contend that, without net neutrality requirements, 
market incentives for content discrimination will lead ISPs to discriminate against 
content that threatens their business models, impeding the type of innovation that has thus 
far marked the development of the Internet.
10
  The Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC” or “Commission”), for its part, has acted through its rulemaking process to 
establish guidelines for network management practices. 
¶3  On September 23, 2011, the FCC published its Final Rules, “Preserving the Open 
Internet” (“Open Internet Rules” or “the Rules”), which took effect on November 20, 
2011.
11
  The Rules presented three ISP network management principles—transparency, 
no blocking, and nondiscrimination—to serve as “protections for broadband service to 
preserve and reinforce Internet freedom and openness.”12  As codified, the purpose of the 
Rules is to “preserve the Internet as an open platform enabling consumer choice, freedom 
of expression, end-user control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without 
permission.”13  The Rules are a development from a 2005 FCC Internet Policy 
Statement
14
 and reflect regulations presented in, and public response to, a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking launched in November of 2009.
15
  More generally, the Rules 
emerged after more than two decades of academic discussion of Internet law
16
 and years 
of debate surrounding the role of these factors in sustaining an open and innovative 
network.
17
  In reaction to this debate, the FCC addressed select concerns expressed by 
 
7
 See James Speta, Supervising Managed Services, 60 DUKE L.J. 1715, 1721 (2011) (explaining that “the 
terms of the network neutrality debate are well known: whether and to what extent government ought to 
supply rules that require the providers of broadband connectivity to carry traffic equally, without 
discrimination as to source, application, or content.”). 
8
 Detailed discussion of supportive and opposing review regarding net neutrality regulation lies outside 
the scope of this Comment.  For a synopsis of arguments as of 2007, see FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, 
at 51–69. 
9
 See, e.g., Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, 3 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 12–13 (2004). 
10
 See, e.g., JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 178–81 (2008). 
11
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,192. These rules have since been codified, in part, at 
FCC Preserving the Open Internet Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2011). 
12
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,192. 
13
 FCC Preserving the Open Internet Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2011). 
14
 See Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,202 (discussing that “these rules are an 
outgrowth of the Commission’s Internet Policy Statement”).  See also Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,222, 60,227 (Oct. 17, 2005). 
15
 Open Internet Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,638 (Nov. 30, 2009); see also 
Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,193 (providing background to the Rules); The Rulemaking 
Process, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://transition.fcc.gov/rules.html (last visited May 9, 2012). 
16
 See Lawrence Lessig, Foreward to JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW 
TO STOP IT vii-viii (2008) (describing the development of book length coverage of the law of the Internet). 
17
 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 60,222 (Oct. 17, 2005) (addressing the FCC’s role in regulating Broadband). For early discussion, see, 
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industry leaders and critics regarding the Commission’s authority to implement these 
Rules.
18
  Nevertheless, the Rules have evoked debate between advocates and opponents 
alike over the authority of the FCC to implement the Rules.
19
  
¶4  The scope of the limitations on FCC authority established in Comcast v. FCC20 
directly impacts this debate and the nature of future regulation.  In Comcast, the D.C. 
Circuit found that the FCC did not have authority to enforce an order against Comcast for 
discriminatory network management practices, reasoning the Commission failed to prove 
its actions were rooted in direct statutory or indirect ancillary authority.
21
  Some 
observers have argued the 2010 D.C. Circuit decision dealt a fatal blow to FCC authority 
to regulate ISP network management.
22
  
¶5  Events subsequent to the Comcast decision have highlighted the importance of 
interpreting the scope and implications of the ruling.  In November 2011, the U.S. Senate 
revisited the Rules, and rejected legislation to repeal the Rules.
23
  Petitioners filed for 
review of the Rules in courts of appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits;
24
 these cases were consolidated and are currently pending in the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
25
  On March 1, 2012, the D.C. Circuit dismissed an 
 
for example, James Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000); Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, 
Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the 
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003); Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding 
Principles for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 5, 5 (2004); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, 
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2005); Robert D. Atkinson & Philip 
J. Weiser, A "Third Way" on Network Neutrality, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 
FOUNDATION (May 30, 2006), http://www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf. 
18
 Discussed throughout Preserving the Open Internet. Introduced in Preserving the Open Internet, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 59,193, and exclusively treated in Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,214–22. 
For example, the Rules allow for “pay-for-priority” arrangements, see Preserving the Open Internet, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 59,204, that had previously been lobbied for by industry but criticized by net neutrality 
advocates. 
19
 See, e.g., Jasmin Melvin, U.S. FCC Draws Tough Court for Web Rule Lawsuits, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 
2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/06/usa-internet-rules-idUSN1E7951UO20111006 
(reporting on petitions challenging FCC authority to implement the Rules and reporting that “[p]ublic 
interest groups have criticized the rules as too weak, saying the FCC was swayed by big industry players 
including AT&T . . . and Comcast Corp.”).  
20
 Comcast, supra note 1, at 642. 
21
Id. at 661. 
22
 See, e.g., Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband Internet 
Access: A Policy Framework for Net Neutrality and an Open Competitive Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 91, 
92–93 (arguing that, following the D.C. Circuit's Comcast decision, the FCC found itself in an “unforeseen 
and ultimately untenable” position where it was unable to ensure “reasonable and nondiscriminatory use” 
of internet access facilities). 
23
 S.J. Res. 6, 112th Cong. (2011); Ben Parr, Senate Rejects Bill to Repeal Net Neutrality, MASHABLE 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/11/10/senate-rejects-net-neutrality-repeal/. Though not 
dispositive of Congressional intent, the vote invites review of legislative intent regarding FCC authority 
over the Rules. 
24
 See Notice of Multicircuit Petitions for Review, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, GN 
Docket No. 09-191 (Oct. 5, 2011); Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, Report and 
Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
310240A1.pdf. 
25
 Tom Schoenberg, Verizon, Other ‘Net Neutrality’ Challenges Consolidated, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 
6, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-10-06/verizon-six-other-net-neutrality-challenges-
consolidated-in-washington.html; see also U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litig., Multi Circuit Petition 
Report, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Multi%20Circuit%20Petition%20(MCP)%20Docket%20Rep
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FCC motion to stay a complaint brought by Verizon and Metro PCS against the FCC to 
challenge its implementation of the Rules.
26
  Verizon and Metro PCS contend the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Comcast established that the FCC lacks authority to regulate ISP 
network management practices and that the Commission’s enforcement of the Rules “is 
in excess of [its] statutory authority.”27  The FCC, in response, claims the appellant’s 
challenges are “baseless” and that the Rules “fulfill specific statutory directives to 
advance broadband investment and to ensure that wireless licensees act in the public 
interest.”28  The Court is expected to hear oral argument in late 2012.  
¶6  This Comment explores the extent to which the Comcast decision limits FCC 
authority to enforce the transparency protection defined in the Rules, codified at 47 
C.F.R. § 8.  Analysis shows that, while Comcast may limit FCC authority to enforce 
elements of the Rules related to network management practices, the transparency 
requirement in the Rules is distinguishable from the content-based regulations, and 
Comcast does not foreclose FCC authority to enforce the transparency requirement.  Part 
II presents the Rules and identifies unique aspects of the transparency requirement.  Part 
III identifies applicable elements of the Comcast decision.  Part IV discusses sources that 
impact FCC jurisdiction, including authorizing statutes and recent case law, with a focus 
on the scope of the Comcast limitations and Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996.
29
  Part IV also addresses standards of review for considering when FCC action 
oversteps its authority.  Part V highlights four specific reasons the FCC retains authority, 
post-Comcast, to enforce transparency requirements.  Part VI concludes. 
¶7  This Comment is limited in several ways.  First, it addresses fixed broadband 
regulation, not mobile regulation.  Further, the Comment does not provide an exhaustive 
list of authorizing statutes,
30
 but rather analyzes sources of FCC authority that show the 
Comcast decision does not preclude enforcement of the transparency requirements in the 
Rules.  Lastly, this Comment provides discussion specifically on post-Comcast FCC 
authority to implement the transparency protection in the Rules, rather than the merits of 
the content-based principles in the Rules. 
II. THE RULES 
¶8  The Rules outline three basic protections, familiar to observers of Internet law and 
regulation: transparency, no blocking, and nondiscrimination.  The FCC contends these 
rules, in conjunction with “reasonable network management,” will protect consumers, 




 Verizon v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2012) (order denying motion to 
hold case in abeyance). 
27
 Protective Petition for Review at 4, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1356 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 30, 2011).  
Petitioners claim enforcement of the Rules “(1) is in excess of the Commission's statutory authority; (2) is 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act; 
(3) is contrary to constitutional right; and (4) is otherwise contrary to law.” Id.   
28
 Brief for Appellee/Respondents at 4, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. Sept.10, 2012), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/verizon-v-fcc-usa-no-11-1355-dc-cir. 
29
 Advanced Telecommunications Incentives, 47 U.S.C. § 706 (1996).  
30
 For example, it does not discuss Telecommunications Act of 1996 provisions related to licensing or 
certain rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
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providers to foster continued openness and innovation on the Internet.
31
  In order to 
effectively discuss FCC authorization to enforce the transparency protection, it is 
necessary to define the transparency protection and consider the role transparency plays 
in relation to other protections provided in the Rules. 
A. The Transparency Requirement 
¶9  The transparency requirement in the Rules aims to ensure “[e]ffective disclosure of 
broadband providers' network management practices and the performance and 
commercial terms of their services.”32  The transparency rule requires the following: 
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall 
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management 
practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access 
services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such 
services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop, 
market, and maintain Internet offerings.
33
 
¶10  The Rules state that, due to disagreement among commentators regarding the level 
of detail that should be subject to disclosure, the “best approach is to allow flexibility.”34  
Rather than strictly defining the scope of disclosure, the Rules provide examples of 





 and commercial terms.
37
  
The Rules state clearly that this list is neither “exhaustive, nor is it a safe harbor,” and 
that each provider must consider the appropriate scope of disclosure required for various 
service offerings.
38
  While the Rules do not mandate a format or structure for disclosure, 
they require that disclosure be “sufficiently clear and accessible” and, at a minimum, be 
available online and at the point of sale.
39
  The FCC also establishes limits on the 
transparency protection.  For example, disclosure of “competitively sensitive 
information,” such as measures to prevent spam, is not required.40 
¶11  As discussed below, the transparency protection is distinguishable from other 








 47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2011). 
34
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,203. In its appellee brief, the FCC refers to the Rules 
as “modest, high level rules.”  Brief for Appellee/Respondents at 4, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355 (D.C. 
Cir. Sept. 10, 2012), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0910/DOC-316186A1.pdf. 
35
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,203 (providing, for example, congestion 
management, application-specific behavior, device attachment rules, and security). 
36
 Id. (providing, for example, services description and impact of specialized services). 
37
 Id. at 59,203–04 (providing, for example, pricing, privacy policies, and redress options).  
38




 Id. at 59,203. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 3  
 
 86 
B. Content Management: No Blocking and Nondiscrimination 
¶12  Both no blocking and nondiscrimination rules are network management principles 
that forbid ISPs from placing content-based restrictions on the movement of data across 
networks. Blocking refers specifically to a provider’s refusal to transmit data for content-
based reasons.
41
 Nondiscrimination is a broader concept than no blocking and concerns a 
provider’s “handling of network traffic,” including both pricing and system 
management.
42
  As codified, the Rules expressly require the following: 
§ 8.5   No blocking. (a) A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband 
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block 




§ 8.7   No unreasonable discrimination. A person engaged in the provision of 
fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, 
shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a 
consumer's broadband Internet access service. Reasonable network management 
shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.
44
 
¶13  The transparency protection plays a role in both principles to the extent that 
transparency is central to “reasonable network management.”  The FCC has used 
reasonable network management to define the scope of these content-based principles in 
the Rules.
45
 For example, the Rules explain that a provider’s discriminatory treatment is 
more likely to be reasonable if that treatment is disclosed to the end-user.
46
  Aiming to 
balance the protection of the users’ rights and the providers’ need to manage network 
congestion and security, the Rules state that such discrimination may be unreasonable 
where it impairs competition, harms end-users, or impairs freedom of expression.
47
  
Another example of the prevalence of the transparency principle throughout the Rules is 
the treatment of “pay-for-priority” structures.  In what appears to reflect a change from 
earlier FCC policy, the Rules acknowledge the merits of usage-based pricing
48
 and 
subject pay-for-priority pricing to a reasonable management standard.
49
  The FCC 
explains that the use of reasonable management standards in the Rules displays treatment 
of the broadband industry as a contract, rather than a common carrier.
50
  As discussed in 
 
41
 Id. at 59,205, see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.5 (2011). 
42
 Id. at 59,205, see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.7 (2011). 
43
 47 C.F.R. § 8.5 (2011). 
44
 Id. at § 8.7. 
45
 Compare Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,205 (stating ISPs “shall not block lawful 
content, applications, services or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management”), with 
id. (“[r]easonable network management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination”). 
46
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg.at 55,205.  
47
 Id. at 55,206. 
48
 See id. (explaining that prohibiting usage-based pricing would “force lighter end users of the network 
to subsidize heavier end users”). 
49
 See id. at 59,206–07. This FCC approach to pay-for-priority strategies appears to be a response to 
industry concerns and a drastic shift from the Open Internet NPRM, in which the FCC proposed a ban on 
any form of content discrimination without a “reasonableness” filter. 
50
 See id. at 55,208 (“This flexibility to customize service arrangements for a particular customer is the 
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Part IV, this classification is significant in identifying statutory support for authority to 
implement the Rules. 
C. Reasonable Network Management 
¶14  The definition of “reasonable network management” is central to the Rules.  
Through the Rules, the Commission sought to provide sufficient guidance for the 
interpretation of what constitutes reasonable network management while avoiding a 
“narrowly” defined and overly restrictive standard that may “overly constrain network 
engineering decisions.”51  Consequently, the Rules provide a broad, purpose-based 
definition of reasonable network management: “A network management practice is 
reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management 
purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology of the 
broadband Internet access service.”52  
¶15  Beyond this definition, the Rules establish that reasonableness must be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis, may differ across varied platforms, and may accommodate 
measures taken by ISPs to manage network security, integrity, traffic unwanted by end 
users, and network congestion.
53
  Finally, the Rules state clearly that all reasonable 
practices are not expressly listed in the Rules and that providers should have flexibility to 
“experiment, innovate, and reasonably manage their networks.”54 
D. Distinguishing the Transparency Requirement 
¶16  The transparency requirement is compellingly presented,55 distinguishable from the 
content management provisions, and prevalent throughout the Rules.
56
  To the extent that 
transparency is necessary to allow consumers to express their market preferences, it 
implicates regulatory distinct considerations from those relevant to content-based 
regulation.
57
  The unique role of this requirement and statutory support for its 
 
hallmark of private carriage, which is the antithesis of common carriage.”).  A common carrier is a services 
provider that (1) “holds himself out to serve indifferently all potential users” and (2) allows customers to 
“transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC 
(NARUC), 533 F.2d 601, 608–09 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing In the Matter of Amendment of Parts 2, 91, and 
99 of the Commission’s Rules Insofar as They Relate to the Industrial Radiolocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 
197, 202 (1966)). 
51
  Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 55,209. 
52
 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(d) (2011).  See also Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 55,208. 
53
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 55,209. 
54
 Id. at 55,210. 
55
 See id. at 59,199 (explaining that complaints registered with the FCC provide cause for concerns 
regarding transparency); see also id. at 59,199, citing Catherine Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and 
Deep-Packet Inspection, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 666–84 (2009) (“In addition to the Madison River and 
Comcast-BitTorrent incidents described above, broadband providers appear to have covertly blocked 
thousands of BitTorrent uploads in the United States throughout early 2008.”).  
56
 This prevalence is demonstrated through reference to the transparency element throughout the Rules 
as presented by the FCC in the Federal Register.  The transparency rule is discussed directly at, Preserving 
the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 55,202-04, and discussed throughout the Rules.  See id. at 59,205, 
59,209, 59,210, 59,214, 59,220, 59,222, 59,223, 59,224, 59,225, 59,231.  
57
 Id. at 59,202 (noting that “disclosure ensures that end users can make informed choices regarding the 
purchase and use of broadband service, which promotes a more competitive market for broadband services 
and can thereby reduce broadband providers’ incentives and ability to violate open Internet principles”). 
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implementation warrant consideration of FCC authority to pursue its implementation 
specifically, as distinct from the Rules, as a whole.  
¶17  Transparency is the sine qua non of network neutrality.58  The FCC has stated the 
purpose of the transparency requirement in the Rules is to ensure that “end users can 
make informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and maintain Internet-based 
offerings.”59 Implicit in this goal is the understanding that transparency impacts market 
competition and user behavior broadly, in a manner unlike the no blocking and 
nondiscrimination principles.  While the latter are concerned with content management 
on a network, the transparency protection requires disclosure of network management 
practices and fosters market competition by guarding against consumer deception.  
Where transparency is not enforced, consumers have no way to reasonably favor one 
provider (and its system of network management) over another.  A lack of market 
accountability would erode competition by denying ISPs the market reaction to their 
network management practices.  This possibility is directly addressed in the Rules and is 
central to FCC authority to implement the transparency rule.
60
  
¶18  The FCC not only expressly addresses this transparency imperative, but also 
demonstrates its importance by ranking it among the factors that may support a showing 
of reasonable discriminatory treatment
61
 and network management practices.
62
  
Transparency is critical to the no blocking analysis to the extent that transparency is a 
factor in determining reasonableness, and blocking is permissible so long as it is 
recognized as “reasonable management.”63  The transparency requirement is implicated 
in each of the protections outlined in the Rules.  Since the transparency requirement is 
distinct from content-based principles, and prevalent throughout the Rules as a whole, it 
is reasonable to assess the specific impact of the Comcast ruling on the authority of the 
FCC to implement the transparency requirement.   
¶19  Part III identifies key elements of the Comcast decision and discusses the express 
and ancillary authorities provided to and argued by the FCC in the Rules. 
III. THE COMCAST DECISION 
¶20  The Comcast ruling directly addressed the authority of the FCC to enforce content 
management provisions—both no blocking and nondiscrimination.  Many observers 
contend the Comcast decision will present significant challenges to future FCC 
 
58
 Id. at 59,193 (recognizing transparency rules as “touchstone of reasonableness” and noting “the near-
unanimous view that the Internet’s openness and the transparency of its protocols have been critical to its 
unparalleled success”). 
59
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,193. 
60
 Id. at 59,217 (“[T]he Commission could conclude that transparency requirements ‘would help 
promote the competitiveness . . . broadband-based communications services’ and ‘thereby facilitate the 
operation of market forces.’”) (quoting the National Cable and Telecommunication Association (NCTA) on 
the role of transparency). 
61
 See supra nn. 57–58, and accompanying text.  See also Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
59,205 (“Transparency is particularly important with respect to the discriminatory treatment of traffic as it 
is often difficult for end users to determine the causes of slow or poor performance . . . .”).  
62
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,209 (“[P]rinciples guiding case-by-case evaluations 
of network management practices . . . include transparency, end-user control, and use-[or application]-
agnostic treatment.”). 
63
 Id. at 59,205 (noting that the no blocking rules are subject to reasonable network management). 
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implementation of the Rules.
64
  However, this Comment suggests that, while Comcast 
may have placed some restrictions on FCC authority to regulate the network management 
practices of ISPs, it does not foreclose FCC enforcement of the Rules, as a whole, or the 
enclosed transparency requirements. 
¶21  The issue in Comcast was whether the FCC exceeded its authority by issuing an 
Order (the Order)
65
 ruling that Comcast network management practices violated various 
principles of the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement (IPS).66  The FCC issued the Order in 
response to complaints filed by public advocacy groups seeking a declaratory ruling on 
Comcast’s practice of interfering with peer-to-peer (P2P) networking applications, 
allegedly in violation of the FCC’s IPS.67  The Commission’s Order stated the FCC had 
jurisdiction over Comcast’s network management practices68 and that, given alternatives 
available to Comcast, its decision to interfere with the P2P applications “contravened . . . 
federal policy.”69  The Order required that Comcast disclose its practices and stated an 
injunction would follow any resumption of such interferences.  Comcast complied with 
the Order and petitioned for review, arguing the Commission acted outside of its 
jurisdiction, circumvented rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), and acted in an “arbitrary and capricious manner.”70  In considering FCC 
authority to implement transparency requirements in the Rules, this Comment focuses on 
the D.C. Circuit’s treatment of the issue of FCC jurisdiction. 
¶22  In Comcast, the FCC had conceded that its Order was outside the scope of its 
express authority, so the D.C. Circuit’s inquiry hinged on whether or not the FCC’s 
actions were within FCC ancillary authority.  To determine whether ancillary authority 
existed, the Court applied a two-step test, further detailed in Part IV, that requires the 
FCC’s actions (1) fall within its general jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications 
Act, and (2) be reasonably ancillary to statutorily mandated responsibilities.
71
  While the 
first element of this test was satisfied, the Court found the second step of the FCC’s 
ancillary authority test was unfulfilled.
72
  The Court concluded the Commission failed to 
show its actions were within its ancillary authority and vacated the Order. 
¶23  In finding the Commission’s actions were not reasonably ancillary to its statutorily 
mandated responsibilities, the Court rejected several provisions of the Communications 
Act the FCC provided in support of its authority.  First, the Court eliminated several 
 
64
 Indeed, in the Verizon complaint, petitioners state that, with the Rules, the FCC “directly responds to 
this Court's decision in Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (2010).”  See Protective Petition for Review 
at 2, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1356 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept 30, 2011). 
65
 In re Formal Compl. of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13,028 (2008). 
66
 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C. Rcd. 
14,986 (2005) (Internet Policy Statement). 
67
 See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 600 F.3d 642, 644–45 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  As defined in 
Comcast, P2P programs “allow users to share large files directly with one another without going through a 
central server” consuming “significant amounts of bandwidth.”  This particular complaint concerned 
interference with data following to an application called BitTorrent. 
68
 Id. at 645 (citing Formal Compl. of Free Press, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. at 13,033–50, para. 12–40). 
69




 Id. at 644 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
72
 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646.  Comcast conceded that the first element of the two-step test from 
American Library used to assess FCC ancillary authority was satisfied, since “Internet service qualifies as 
‘interstate and foreign communication by wire.’”  
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sections as “policy statements,”73 rather than authorizing statutes, distinguishing between 
the two and affirming that the former cannot serve as a basis for ancillary authority.
74
  
Next, the Court considered and rejected five statutory provisions that “could arguably be 
read to delegate regulatory authority to the Commission,” 75 including Sections 706, 256, 
257, 201, and 623 of the Communications Act.  
¶24  In justifying its authority to implement the Open Internet Rules, the FCC cited, 
among others, four sections rejected in Comcast as authority for the FCC to implement 
the Comcast Order (Sections 706, 256, 257, and 201).  However, due to several factors 
revisited in Part V, the Court’s holding in Comcast did not foreclose FCC enforcement of 
the transparency requirement in the Rules.  These factors include: (1) the transparency 
requirement is distinguishable from the content-management Order under review in 
Comcast; (2) the transparency requirement is supported by statutory sources that were not 
addressed in Comcast (such as Section 254 and 154); (3) Section 706, as read with 
appropriate Chevron deference,
76
 supports FCC enforcement of the Rules; and (4) 
Comcast, in fact, recognizes authority provided by Section 257 to the FCC to enforce 
transparency requirements necessary to fulfill reporting obligations.  To effectively 
explore these specific authorities, it is necessary to first identify the framework for the 
Commission’s general authority to enforce the Rules. 
¶25  Part IV reviews FCC express and ancillary authority as it relates to enforcement of 
the Rules, as well as the standard of review under which future FCC action may be 
scrutinized. 
IV. SOURCES AND SCOPE OF FCC AUTHORITY: EXPRESS AUTHORITY, ANCILLARY 
AUTHORITY, AND A STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶26  The FCC derives its authority from express and ancillary sources.  Ancillary 
authority is a Congressional power grant, rooted in the “broad language”77 of 
Communications Act § 154(i), which has been restricted through case law.  Most 
recently, the court in Comcast observed the ancillary power as “contingent upon 
specifically delegated powers.”78  To thoroughly address the extent to which the Comcast 
decision impacts FCC authority to implement the transparency requirements in the Rules, 
it is instructive to identify and analyze express authority,
79
 the status of ancillary 
 
73
 Sections dismissed as policy statements include Commc’ns Act Sections 230(b) and Section 151. 
74
 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 654.  “Policy statements alone cannot provide the basis for the 
Commission’s exercise of ancillary authority.”  The D.C. Circuit has stated that the “axiomatic principle” 
that policy statements are not authorizing is established in the following cases: U.S. v. Southwestern Cable 
Co, 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (Southwestern Cable), U.S. v. Midwest Video Co. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 
649 (1972), FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979), Nat’l Ass’n of 
Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  See Am. Library, 406 F.3d 
at 691.  The court provides several other examples of the application of this principle, including: Computer 
and Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 
1307 (D.C. Cir. 1988); and New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
75
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658.  
76
 See infra notes 127–39 and accompanying text. 
77
 Id. at 645 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(i)). 
78
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 653. 
79
 Note that the FCC provides and analyzes much of its express authority directly in the Rules. 
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authority, and standard of review for evaluating whether the FCC has exceeded its 
authority.  The following analysis of these authorities supports the argument that 
Comcast does not directly foreclose FCC enforcement of the transparency requirements 
in the Rules. 
A. Express Authority 
¶27  The FCC was created and authorized by Congress through the Communications 
Act of 1934.
80
  Since that time, its authority has undergone statutory changes and been 
shaped by case law.
81
  Initially, the Communications Act granted the FCC “express and 
expansive authority”82 to regulate common carrier services such as landline telephone 
use,
83
 radio transmissions such as broadcast television, radio, and cellular telephone 
use,
84
 and cable services such as cable television.
85
  As new technologies emerged, 
Congress responded, addressing the regulation of broadband services, specifically, with 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
¶28  In the Rules, the FCC presents four principle categories of authorizing sources, 
citing Sections from Titles I, II, III, and VI of the Communications Act,
86
 the Cable Act 
of 1992,
87
 and the 1996 Act
88
 to establish its jurisdiction: (1) authority to implement 
Section 706 of the 1996 Act (Section 706);
89
 (2) authority to implement responsibilities 
under Titles II, III, and VI to promote competition and investment in, as well as to protect 
end users of, voice, video, and audio services (market integrity sections);
90
 (3) authority 
to “protect the public interest through spectrum licensing” (licensing sections);91 and, (4) 
authority to collect information necessary to “perform its reporting obligations to 
Congress”92 (reporting sections).  Of these statutory provisions, there is a particularly 
strong argument for FCC authority to implement the transparency requirement in the 
Rules through Sections 706, market integrity Section 254,
1
 and reporting Sections 154(k) 
and 257(a) and (c).  The following discussion presents the FCC’s argument for the 
authority it derives from these sections; Part IV assesses the impact of Comcast.  
¶29  Section 706 of the 1996 Act (Section 1302 of the Communications Act, amended) 
defines advanced telecommunications capability as “high-speed, switched, broadband 
telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality 
 
80
 47 U.S.C. § 151  
81
 For example: All Channel Receiver Act of 1962; the Communications Amendments Act of 1982; the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.  
82
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645. 
83
 Wireline telecommunications services are governed by Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 
which imposes various common-carrier requirements on telecommunications carriers [for wire services]. 
84
 Title III of the Act governs radio transmissions. 
85
 Title IV of the Act governs cable services.  
86
 See Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,214–22. 
87
 Id. at 59,219. 
88
 See id. at 59,191, 59,214–16.  
89
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,214 (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), Communications Act §§ 706, 151, 152, 230). 
90
 Id. at 59,216 (citing Communications Act of 1996 §§ 201, 202, 251, 256, 303, 307, 548, 616, 628). 
91
 Id. at 59,219 (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§ 304, 316, 307, 309). 
92
 Id. at 59,220 (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§ 154, 257, 218). 
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voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.”93  Section 
706 further establishes that the FCC has broad authority regarding broadband regulation, 
stating: 
(a) The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction over 
telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and 
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by 
utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote 
competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods 
that remove barriers to infrastructure investment. 
(b) . . . the Commission shall determine whether advanced telecommunications 
capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion. 
If the Commission’s determination is negative, it shall take immediate action to 
accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure 
investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.
94
  
¶30  Section 706 is one of several sources the FCC has presented to support its express 
authority to implement the Rules as a whole.  While Comcast calls into question FCC 
ancillary authority to implement the Rules as a whole, the negative treatment of Section 
706 in Comcast does not nullify all authority provided by the provision to the FCC to 
implement transparency requirements in the Rules. 
¶31  The FCC argues market integrity provisions, Sections 230 and 254, lend particular 
support to enforce transparency requirements.  Section 230, it claims, provides authority 
to adopt the Rules in two forms: first, in reference to Congressional policy of promoting 
“continued development of the Internet” and preserving “the competitive market;”95 and, 
second, as an overarching Congressional policy that restricts Section 706 from becoming 
a “limitless” and “boundless” authority grant, thus demonstrating the more narrowing, 
authorizing scope of Section 706.  Section 230 of the statute provides that it is the policy 
of the U.S.: 
 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media;  
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation;  
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control 
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use 
the Internet and other interactive computer services;  
 
93
 47 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2011). 
94
 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a), (b) (2011) (emphasis added). 
95
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,214 (stating that in § 230 of the Act, Congress 
announced “the policy of . . . promoting the continued development of the Internet . . . and encouraging the 
development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals 
. . . while also preserving the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services.”) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996)). 
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(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to 




¶32  Arguing Congressional intent supports FCC power to implement the Rules, the 
Commission appears to interpret Section 230 in terms of Section 254, explaining that the 
FCC has the responsibility to design and maintain a “[f]ederal universal program that has 
as one of several objectives making ‘access to advanced telecommunications and 
information services’ available in ‘all regions of the Nation.’”97  The FCC argues that 
Sections 230 and 254 provide the FCC authority to adopt transparency requirements, to 
the extent transparency ensures that consumers make informed decisions regarding their 
ISPs, thus fostering a competitive telecommunications market.
98
  However, since courts 
have established that Internet service provision is not a common carrier service,
99
 and 
Section 230 is specific to common carrier services, it is arguable that Section 254 remains 
the market integrity provision that authorizes enforcement of the Rules. 
¶33  Just as transparency requirements in the Rules are integral to FCC duties to comply 
with market integrity obligations, they also enable the FCC to fulfill its responsibility to 
report to Congress, as required under Sections 154(k), 257(a) and (c), and 218.
100
  Section 
218 is distinguishable from 154(k) and 257 in that it permits the FCC to collect “full and 
complete information,” but, as with Section 230, its application is strictly limited to 
common carriers and therefore inapplicable.
101
  Sections 154(k) and 257(a), however, are 
applicable to ISPs.  Section 154(k) requires the FCC to present an annual report to 
Congress, including: “data . . . of value in the determination of questions connected with 
the regulation of interstate and foreign wire and radio communication,” as well as 
“specific recommendations to Congress as to additional legislation which the 
Commission deems necessary.”102  Similarly, Section 257 requires the FCC to report to 
Congress every three years on “market entry barriers” in the telecommunications 
industry.  To the extent these provisions authorize the FCC to collect information to 
formulate legislative proposals and reports for Congress, they lend authority to the 
Commission for the enforcement of the transparency requirement in the Rules.
103
  
¶34  Thus, even after eliminating statutory support specific to common carriers, Sections 
706, 254, 154, and 257 not only provide authority for FCC enforcement of the Rules, 
generally, but also offer specific, express support for enforcement of the transparency 
 
96
 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (1996). 
97
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,214 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254). 
98
 Id. at 59,214–15. 
99
 See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005) (stating ISPs are 
“not subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the Commission has 
jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate 
interstate and foreign communications, see [47 U.S.C.] §§ 151–161”).  See also Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. 
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702 (1979) (Midwest II).  
100
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,220 (explaining that Sections 4(k) and 218 “provide 





 47 U.S.C. § 154(k). 
103
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,220. 
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requirement.  In addition to providing express authority, these statutes may also serve as a 
basis upon which the FCC may extend its ancillary authority. 
B. Ancillary Authority 
¶35  It is well established that, in order for an administrative agency to exercise 
authority, Congress must first delegate that authority.
104
  Courts have held it to be 
“axiomatic” that an agency’s authority be rooted in a statutory grant of power from 
Congress.
105
  However, the nature of statutory power may not always be express.  In 
addition to express authority, the FCC may exercise ancillary authority, as affirmed most 
recently by the court in Comcast.
106
  Provided in Section 154(i) of the Communications 
Act, ancillary authority imposes on the FCC the duty to “perform any and all acts, make 
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as 
may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”107  
¶36  The scope of FCC jurisdiction under its ancillary authority has been distilled into a 
two-step test.  The D.C. Circuit first clarified this test in American Library Association v. 
FCC when it held FCC ancillary authority exists where both elements of the two-step test 
are satisfied: (1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the 
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject, and (2) the regulations are reasonably 




¶37  In American Library, and subsequent D.C. Circuit decisions, the Court has noted 





 Midwest Video I,
111




¶38  In Southwestern Cable, the Court held the FCC had the authority to restrict the 
expansion of community antenna televisions (CATV) by enforcing carriage and duplicity 
rules against a CATV provider,
113





 of the Communications Act.  Thus, under the FCC’s “broad 
 
104
 Am. Library Ass’n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also id. at 
698 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) ([T]he FCC 
“literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
105
 Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 691). 
106
 Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 692 (“The FCC may act either pursuant to express statutory authority 
to promulgate regulations addressing a variety of designated issues involving communications . . . or 
pursuant to ancillary jurisdiction.”). 
107
 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (“The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, 
and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its 
functions.”). 
108
 Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 691–92. 
109
 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646 (“Courts have come to call the Commission’s section 4(i) power its 
ancillary authority, a label that derivers from three foundational Supreme Court decisions [Southwestern, 
Midwest I, and Midwest II].”); see also Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 700 (“The Supreme Court has 
delineated the parameters of . . . ancillary jurisdiction in three cases [Southwestern, Midwest I, and Midwest 
II]).” 
110
 U.S. v. Sw. Cable Corp., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
111
 U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649 (1972). 
112
 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979) . 
113
 Sw. Cable Corp., 392 U.S. at 161, 166. 
114
 47 U.S.C. § 151 (authorizing the FCC to “[m]ake available . . . to all the people of the United States . 
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responsibilities,” the Commission had authority to take actions “reasonably ancillary to 
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities.”116  Further, the 
Court found the FCC had issued an order “not inconsistent with” and “necessary in the 
execution of” the Communications Act.117  
¶39  The subsequent Midwest Video decisions affirmed the two-step test presented in 
Southwestern for assessing the scope and limitations of ancillary authority.  In Midwest 
Video I, the Court held the FCC was authorized to require CATVs with more than 3,500 
subscribers to provide an outlet for local producers, reasoning the regulation was 
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various other 
responsibilities.
118
  In Midwest Video II, however, the Court found the FCC exceeded its 
authority when it issued rules requiring cable service providers with at least 3,500 
subscribers and broadcast signals to both “make available certain channels for access by 
third parties” and “to furnish equipment and facilities for access purposes.”119  The Court 
noted that such regulation would (by the Commission’s own admission) submit 
broadcasters to treatment as common carriers,
120
 and reasoned that, since the Act 
prohibited treatment of broadcasters as common carriers,
121
 the regulation in question 
could not satisfy the ancillary authority test.
122
  In short, the Court established an 
important limitation on ancillary authority by holding ancillary authority was not capable 
of overriding express, statutory limitations on FCC authority. 
¶40  In the decades since Midwest Video II, the two-step test has been applied numerous 
times by the D.C. Circuit, notably in Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC 
(NARUC II)
123
 and most recently in Comcast v. FCC.  Consistent with the Midwest Video 
II constraints, the court in NARUC II found the “Commission’s ancillary authority is 
‘incidental to, and contingent upon, specifically delegated powers under the Act.’”124  
The D.C. Circuit most recently revisited the scope of FCC ancillary power in Comcast, 
and reinforced its NARUC II restriction.
125
 
¶41  In Comcast, the D.C. Circuit further refined the two-step test, specifying that 
provisions of the Communications Act which “set forth only congressional policy” do not 
satisfy the second element of the two-step test that requires ancillary authority be tied to 
 
. . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges”). 
115
  47 U.S.C. § 152 (extending FCC jurisdiction to “all interstate and foreign communication by wire or 
radio”). 
116
 Sw. Cable Corp., 392 U.S. at 178. 
117
 Id. at 181 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303(r)). 
118
 Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 662 (1972).  See also Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 701. 
119
 Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689, 691–96 (1979).  See also Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 701. 
120




 Id. at 708–09. 
123
 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). 
124
 Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 612) 
(emphasis added).  
125
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651–58 (refuting an expansive interpretation of the Commission’s ancillary 
power, stating that policy statements alone “cannot provide the basis for the Commission’s exercise of 
ancillary authority,” and determining that in Comcast and in NARUC II, the FCC failed to establish its 
regulatory authority as ancillary to an express authority). 





  Reasoning that policy statements are “not 
delegations of regulatory authority,” the Court held that ancillary authority must be tied 
to Title II, III, or VI provisions that “delegate regulatory authority to the Commission.”127  
¶42  These considerations of the scope of express and ancillary authority are instructive, 
but alone, they are not determinative of post-Comcast FCC authority to enforce 
transparency requirements in the Rules.  The standard of review that a court will use to 
consider future challenges to FCC enforcement of the Rules will also impact future 
challenges to FCC authority to implement transparency requirements in Rules.  The 
Comcast decision is as relevant to considering this standard as it is to determining the 
scope of ancillary authority.  As discussed below, the standard demonstrated in Comcast, 
coupled with Court guidance regarding deference to FCC actions addressed in Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet (Brand X),
128
 compose the appropriate 
framework for considering FCC authority to implement transparency requirements in the 
Rules.  Analysis through this framework suggests there is support for FCC authority to 
enforce transparency requirements established in the Rules. 
C. Comcast, Brand X, and a Standard of Review 
¶43  In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that when FCC regulations are under review, 
the Commission is entitled to the deference established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc. (Chevron).  In Comcast, the D.C. Circuit found that the Brand X 
standard of review was not determinative, but based its reasoning on the fact that the FCC 
actions under dispute in Comcast conflicted with other precedent.  Post-Comcast, the 
standard of review established in Brand X still requires courts to apply the deference 
framework established in Chevron (“Chevron deference”) in reviewing FCC actions.129  
This treatment suggests that Section 706 provides authority to the FCC for enforcement 
of the Rules and the transparency requirement. 
¶44  In Brand X, the Supreme Court considered the validity of an FCC Order that 
classified broadband providers as “information service” providers rather than 
“telecommunications service” providers.130  The implication of the Brand X Order was 
that broadband providers would be subject to common carrier regulation under Title II of 
the Communications Act, rather than exempt, as telecommunications carriers.  Petitioners 
challenged the Order, and the appeal went to the Ninth Circuit.
131
  The Ninth Circuit 
decided not to apply Chevron deference, but rather grounded its holding in the “‘stare 
decisis effect’ of its own decision in AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, which had 
 
126
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651. 
127
 Id. at 651–54. 
128
 In Brand X, the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit, holding that the FCC’s interpretation of the 
term “telecommunications service” should have been reviewed using the deferential framework of Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet, 545 
U.S. 967, 980–82 (2005).  See infra text accompanying notes 130–136. 
129
 Chevron deference refers to the principle that, when interpreting a statute that is silent or ambiguous 
on an issue that falls within the general jurisdiction of a federal agency, a Court must defer to an 
interpretation by the agency that is reasonable under construction of the statute.  Id.  See also Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
130
 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 968. 
131
 Id.  The Ninth Circuit won the case via judicial lottery. 
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held that cable modem service is a ‘telecommunications service.’”132 Upon Supreme 
Court review, a plurality reversed the Ninth Circuit, reasoning in part that Chevron 
provided the applicable framework for reviewing the FCC’s Order.133  The Court 
explained that “[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's 
interpretation under the Chevron framework,” but rather “[u]nexplained inconsistency is, 
at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change 
from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act [APA].”134  Reinforcing 
the deference afforded to agency’s decisions in cases of statutory ambiguity, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that, in Chevron itself, “this Court deferred to an agency interpretation 
that was a recent reversal of agency policy.”135 
¶45  In Comcast, the FCC argued that the deference to the FCC the Supreme Court 
demonstrated in Brand X was binding in the Comcast case.
136
  The D.C. Circuit 
dismissed this argument.
137
  However, the court rejected the argument, not because the 
Brand X decision was not binding or not applicable, but rather because the actions in 
Comcast the FCC attempted to support with Brand X “[ran] afoul of Southwestern Cable 
and Midwest Video I.”138  Thus, so long as application of the Rules do not similarly 
contradict Southwestern and Midwest Video precedents (or otherwise conflict with 
binding case law), it appears that the Brand X precedent may remain binding in in the 
D.C. Circuit, even after Comcast, for purposes of interpreting FCC authority to enforce 
the Rules.  
¶46  It seems likely that this Brand X deference will apply to future challenges to the 
FCC’s authority to implement the Rules.  Specifically, the Brand X application of 
Chevron deference calls into question the rejection in Comcast of the FCC’s argument 
that Section 706 authorized its enforcement of the Order.  As noted above, in Comcast, 
the sole reason the Court provided for rejecting the FCC’s argument that 706 served as a 
delegated power that supports ancillary authority, was that a previous decision announced 
by the FCC conflicted with the Commission’s interpretation in Comcast.  Since Brand X 
establishes that Chevron deference should be used to review FCC orders in regards to 
interpretations of the Telecommunications Act,
139
 and Chevron deference accords an 
agency the ability to “consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a 
continuing basis,” it seems the FCC should not be bound by its own previous 
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 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 968 
133
 Id. at 981. 
134
 Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
46–57 (1983)).  The Court in Brand X continued to further clarify that “if the agency adequately explains 
the reasons for a reversal of policy, ‘change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave 
the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.’”  Brand X, 545 U.S. 
at 980–81. 
135
 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. 
136
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 649–51. 
137
 Id.  
138
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651 (clarifying the “Commission cannot justify regulating the network 
management practices of cable Internet providers simply by citing Brand X’s recognition that it [the FCC] 
may have ancillary authority to require such providers to unbundle the components of their services” and 
confirming that “nothing… suggests that the Court was abandoning the fundamental approach to ancillary 
authority.”). 
139
 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 991–97 (discussing that the term “telecommunications service” as used in the 
Communications Act is ambiguous). 
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¶47  While the Court in Comcast appears to have left in tact the Brand X standard of 
review for FCC authority, its discussion of Brand X also reinforces requirements for 
establishing ancillary power that extends beyond the deference established in Brand X.  
Addressing the two-prong test described above, the Comcast ruling confirmed that FCC 
ancillary authority cannot be supported by broad authority, and the deferential Brand X 
treatment of FCC decisions must be “independently justified.”141  Further, the Court notes 
that such justification must be established on a “case-by-case basis.”142  Under this 
Comcast standard, it seems that FCC authority available through the Brand X 
interpretation of Section 706 may not, in isolation, provide sufficient authority to 
implement the Rules.  However, in light of the Brand X standard of review, it also seems 
that the negative treatment in Comcast of authority granted through Section 706 should 
not vitiate ancillary authority that Section 706 may lend to FCC enforcement of the 
transparency requirement in the Rules. 
¶48  Thus, in considering future challenges to FCC authority to enforce the Rules and, 
by inclusion, the transparency requirement, it appears the standard of review in Brand X 
requires courts to accord the FCC Chevron deference, where appropriate.  Meanwhile, 
the standard established in Comcast appears to require a case-by-case analysis to 
determine when the FCC has properly justified use of its ancillary authority.   
¶49  Part IV has discussed the role of express authority, the scope of ancillary authority, 
and the standards of review for FCC Orders as established by the Supreme Court in 
Brand X and by the D.C. Circuit in Comcast.  Building on this foundation, Part V 
considers the impact of the Comcast decision on FCC authority to implement the Rules 
generally, and distinguishes the transparency protection from the Rules to clarify specific 
support for the latter. 
V. THE COMCAST EFFECT ON THE TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENT 
¶50  While the Comcast decision may place some limitations on FCC authority to 
regulate the network management practices of ISPs, it does not foreclose FCC 
enforcement of the Rules as a whole, and its scope does not appear to limit authority to 
enforce transparency protections.  As demonstrated above, transparency protections in the 
Rules are distinguishable from other requirements, and the Comcast decision poses a 
lesser threat to transparency protections outlined in the Rules than to content management 
protections.  
¶51  Four factors demonstrate FCC authority to enforce the transparency protection and 
show that authority is consistent with the decision in Comcast.  First, the facts in Comcast 
suggest it restricts regulation of content-focused network management practices, which 
may be distinguished from transparency requirements.  Second, when evaluated with the 
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 Id. at 981 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–864). 
141
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651 (holding “each and every assertion of jurisdiction over cable television 
must be independently justified as reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s power over broadcasting” 
(quoting NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 612)). 
142
 Id. (establishing “the Commission must defend its exercise of ancillary authority on a case-by-case 
basis”) (citing Midwest Video I, 440 U.S. at 696). 
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appropriate Brand X standard, Chevron deference indicates previous FCC interpretations 
of Section 706 do not preclude the FCC from basing ancillary authority on Section 706.  
Third, FCC authority to enforce the transparency requirement is supported by statutory 
sources that were not addressed in Comcast, including market integrity provisions, such 
as Section 254, and reporting provisions, such as Section 154.  Fourth, Comcast’s 
treatment of Section 257 reinforces, rather than erodes, FCC authority to implement 
transparency requirement, if not the Rules as a whole. 
A. FCC activity under review in Comcast is distinguishable from enforcement of the 
transparency requirements. 
¶52  The Comcast decision was concerned with content-based regulations, which may 
be distinguished from transparency regulations.  The FCC Order reviewed in Comcast 
concerned ISP content discrimination of a P2P service, while the transparency 
requirement outlined in the Rules is concerned with ISP disclosure of its network 
management practices.
143
  While the holding in Comcast may restrict FCC authority to 
determine whether ISP treatment of specific content is unreasonable, Comcast does not 
appear to directly restrict FCC authority to require ISP disclosure of such treatment.  In 
addition to this distinction, specific statutory sources such as Communications Act 
Sections 706, 254, 154(k), and 257 also support FCC authority to enforce the 
transparency requirement in the Rules. 
B. Section 706 authorizes FCC enforcement of the transparency requirements. 
¶53  While the Court in Comcast rejected the FCC’s argument that Section 706 provided 
authority for the FCC to issue the Order in Comcast, Section 706 may in fact authorize 
the Commission to enforce the transparency requirements established in the Rules.  As 
noted above, Brand X established that Chevron deference should be applied, where 
appropriate.
144
  Brand X also confirmed the applicability of two key Chevron principles: 
1) that agency inconsistency is not grounds for finding a decision to be “arbitrary or 
capricious” under the APA, and 2) that an agency is not necessarily bound by its previous 
decisions.
145
  The Court in Comcast held the FCC failed to establish that its 
implementation of the Order was authorized soley based upon the Brand X precedent, but 
it did not determine the Brand X standard was inapplicable.
146
  Ironically, in Comcast, the 
D.C. Circuit based its rejection of Section 706 as an authorizing authority entirely on a 
previous FCC interpretation of the section.
147
  However, granting the Commission the 
deference outlined in Brand X for purposes of evaluating Section 706, it appears that the 
Commission should be free to “consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its 
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 Compare In re Formal Compl. of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC. Rcd. 13,028 (2008), with 47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2011). 
144
 See supra Part IV.C. 
145
 Id.  
146
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 650 (holding the Court “need not decide whether the Court’s discussion of 
ancillary authority in Brand X qualifies as ‘authoritative’” because the Commission “runs afoul of 
Southwestern Cable and Midwestern Video I.”). 
147
 Id. at 659 (concluding that the “Commission remains bound by its earlier conclusion that section 706 
grants no regulatory authority”). 
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policy on a continuing basis,”148 so long as that agency “adequately explains the reasons 
for a reversal of policy.”149  The history of the Open Internet Rules demonstrates ample 
explanation for the use of Section 706 the Commission asserts in the Rules, beginning 
with the 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and continuing through to the 2011 
publication of the Rules.  Thus, even assuming the validity of the Comcast rejection of 
Section 706 as an authority, it seems that a future Court would be able recognize the 
authority Section 706 provides for enforcing the Rules, given the FCC’s explanation of 
its policy and notice to the industry.
150
 
C. FCC authority to implement transparency requirements in the Rules is supported by 
statutory provisions that were not addressed in Comcast. 
¶54  FCC authority to implement the Rules and the transparency requirement is also 
supported by statutory sources that were not addressed in Comcast, including market 
integrity and reporting provisions.  Part IV discussed the statutory sources the FCC 
presented in the Rules that provide its authority to enforce the Rules, including Sections 
706, 230, 254, 154(k), and 257.  As noted, Comcast addressed Sections 706 (analyzed 
above), 230, and 257.  However, the Comcast decision did not address the market 
integrity provision, Section 254, and the reporting provision, Section 154.  Thus, the 
Comcast precedent does not detract from the authority these statutory sources provide the 
FCC.  In fact, where the court in Comcast did address a reporting provision (Section 




D. Comcast treatment of Section 257 is consistent with FCC authority to implement 
transparency requirements. 
¶55  The treatment in Comcast of Section 257 reinforces, rather than erodes, FCC 
authority to implement transparency requirements, if not the Rules as a whole.  As noted 
above, Section 257 requires the FCC to report to Congress every three years on “market 
entry barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and ownership 
of telecommunications services and information services.”152  In Comcast, the Court 
rejected Section 257 as grounds for extending Commission ancillary authority to “dictate 
the operation of an otherwise unregulated service.”153  However, in that very paragraph, 
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 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 at 863–64, (1984)). 
149
 Id. While this Comment is focused on FCC authority to implement the transparency requirement as 
opposed to the Rules as a whole, the process behind the announcement of the Rules suggests the FCC 
satisfied the “clear notice requirement” to receive Chevron deference for its Rules.  
150
 Regarding the transparency requirement in the rules, the FCC voted to seek public comment on the 
draft Rules on Oct. 22, 2009 and held a series of open workshops before the Rules were published in the 
Federal Register on September 23, 2011 and became effective on November 20, 2011.  See generally Open 
Internet: Ensuring that every American has access to open and robust Internet service, FED. COMMC’N. 
COMM., OPEN INTERNET, http://www.fcc.gov/topic/open-internet#history (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
151
 See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
152
 47 U.S.C. § 257(a). 
153
 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659. (“We readily accept that certain assertions of Commission authority could 
be ‘reasonably ancillary’ to the Commission’s statutory responsibility to issue a report to Congress. For 
example, the Commission might impose disclosure requirements on regulated entities in order to gather 
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the Court acknowledged Section 257 may be used as a basis for ancillary authority to 
perform such functions as “impos[ing] disclosure requirements on regulated entities.”154 
¶56  Thus, while the Comcast decision may restrict FCC authority to regulate the 
network management practices of ISPs, it does not destroy FCC authority to enforce the 
transparency requirements outlined in the Rules. 
VI. ONWARD, TOWARDS A DISCLOSURE-BASED SYSTEM? 
¶57  As the debate over net neutrality regulations continues, the authority of the FCC to 
enforce the Rules will remain a contentious issue.  In considering that debate, this 
Comment has addressed the specific issue of the scope of post-Comcast FCC authority to 
implement transparency requirements outlined in the Rules.  The Rules require “effective 
disclosure of broadband providers' network management practices and the performance 
and commercial terms of their services.”155  This transparency protection is 
distinguishable from content-based regulations that require compliance with no blocking 
and nondiscrimination policies.  The transparency protection is manifest throughout the 
Rules as a factor in determining “reasonable network management.”  To the extent the 
transparency requirement is critical to the FCC’s mandate to monitor market competition 
and report to Congress, the statutory sources that provide FCC authority to enforce 
transparency rules are distinct from those that support enforcement of content-based 
regulations. 
¶58  The decision in Comcast does not foreclose FCC enforcement of transparency 
requirements critical to the Open Internet Rules.  While Comcast may restrict the ability 
of the FCC to regulate content-based network management practices, the precedent does 
not preclude FCC enforcement of the transparency requirement for the four reasons 
detailed above: the actions reviewed in Comcast are distinguishable from enforcement of 
the transparency requirements, Section 706 authorizes enforcement of the transparency 
requirement, authority to enforce transparency requirements is supported by statutory 
provisions unaddressed in Comcast, and the Comcast decision is consistent with the use 
of provisions such as Section 257 to authorize enforcement of the transparency 
requirements in the Rules.   
¶59  This Comment has reserved for future discussion the merits of and authority to 
implement various forms of content-based net neutrality regulations.  Rather, it has 
suggested that, under the current regulatory scheme, the FCC appears to have authority to 
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